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I. Introduction
Family law has come a long way. Once occupying at best a marginal
role in the law school curriculum-and an almost unmentionably low rank
in the legal profession-family law has risen in every respect.' Now an
undeniably complex, intellectual, and dynamic area for students, lawyers,
and researchers alike, family law even has its own canon. The existence,
content, scope and pitfalls of this canon-"the dominant narratives, stories,
examples, and ideas that judges, lawmakers, and (to a less crucial extent)
commentators repeatedly invoke to describe and explain family law and its
governing principles"-are the centerpiece of Jill Hasday's thoughtful new
book, Family Law Reimagined."
The family law canon, Hasday argues, is not "limited to texts," and
"does not take the form of a short and definitive reading list." 3 It is, rather,
"a series of overriding stories that purport to make sense of how the law
governs family members and family life," stories that are "so embedded in
the field" and "reiterated, reinforced, and relied on" so often that "they are
routinely assumed to be matters of common sense-so taken for granted as
to supposedly require no explanation or defense."4 But there's a cost to this
level of comfort with the common narratives-the canon, Hasday suggests,
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1. See Nicholas Bala, There Are Some Elephants in the Room: Being Realistic About Law
Students, Law Schools, and the Legal Profession When Thinking About Family Law Education, 44
FAM. CT. REv. 577, 580-81 (2006) (exploring why family law "has been low in the hierarchy" of
legal education); Janet Halley, What Is Family Law?: A Genealogy, Part 1, 23 YALE J.L. &
HUMAN. 1, 1-6 (2011) (surveying the development of family law as a distinct area of study). On
the historical role of family law in legal education and the legal profession, see SANFORD N.
KATz, FAMILY LAW IN AMERICA 2-9 (2003).
2. JILL ELAINE HASDAY, FAMILY LAW REIMAGINED 2 (2014).
3. Id. at 2.
4. Id. at 2-3.
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"helps structure and constrain family law's imaginative universe." 5
Moreover, the canon "misdescribes the reality of family law, misdirects
attention away from the actual problems that family law confronts, and
misshapes the policies that courts, legislatures, and advocates pursue."
6
In this Review, I will explore the main themes of the book, which first
depicts the components of the family law canon and then suggests what is
missing from it. Then, I will consider Hasday's normative claim-that the
canon is ultimately more harmful than beneficial. I focus in Part III on the
fall of the federal Defense of Marriage Act and suggest that the existence of
a family law canon, even a flawed one, made it easier to smoke out
Congress's true, and malignant, intent. Even a loose "canon" sometimes
hits its target. In Part IV, I examine the perils of an imperfect canon,
agreeing with Hasday that there are many concrete instances in which,
relying on canonical narratives, courts and legislators have missed the
opportunity to freshly evaluate or construct laws and policies appropriate
for the modem family. Parentage law, which determines which adults have
legal rights to which children, is just such a victim. Hampered by the
narrative of family law's break from its past, and the narrative about the
child-centric nature of family law, courts and lawmakers have struggled
mightily to apply rules designed for an entirely different modal family to
the vast spectrum of families they confront today.
II. The Crux of the Canon and Its Limitations
Family Law Reimagined opens, powerfully, with two canonical stories
that shape our understanding of family law. But first, it asks, what do we
mean when we talk about "family law"? Hasday relies on the following
definition: "[F]amily law regulates the creation and dissolution of legally
recognized family relationships and determines legal rights and
responsibilities that turn on family status."7  Defining family law is
important, Hasday argues, because the canon is shaped by the notion of
what she terms "family law's exceptionalism"-that the field is "distinctly
set off from other areas of the law, so that legal rules and presumptions in
force elsewhere do not apply or are actually reversed within family law." 8
And when we do talk about family law, she suggests, we tend to offer two
common observations: (1) family law is a matter of state, rather than
federal, law and (2) the family is insulated from the principles of market
exchange that otherwise pervade law.
5. Id. at 3.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 18.
8. Id. at 15.
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Chapter 1 is devoted to the localism narrative, which, Hasday claims,
is used both descriptively and normatively: Family law is, and ought to
remain, reserved to the states. 9 She has two main quarrels with the localism
narrative. First, she argues, it is "employed selectively against specific
federal initiatives and not others." 10 An unpopular proposal is likely to be
met with the criticism that it is inappropriate merely because it is on the
federal level rather than because it is misguided or harmful, or simply better
handled on a state or more local level." And the firm belief that family law
is a matter of local concern makes courts and lawmakers more inclined to
ensure that it remains that way. The development of a seemingly rootless
"domestic relations" exception to federal jurisdiction, which allows federal
courts to sidestep messy divorce cases even when the requirements for
diversity jurisdiction are otherwise met, is a good example of the spillover
from descriptive to normative principles. 12  Second, she explains, this
narrative is simply not true. Although it may have once been more true that
the federal government largely steered clear of family law, the United States
Code is literally littered with enactments that directly provide benefits and
impose obligations based on family status.13 And in some areas, such as
child support law, Congress has deliberately usurped the field in order to
change it, dictating to states the method that must be used for determining
child support awards (guidelines) and the means of enforcement that must
be made available (everything from registries to assignment of rights for
welfare cases to sanctions for nonpayment).14 Indeed, Hasday spends many
pages exhaustively detailing federal family law, comprising issues as
disparate as spousal immigration benefits to evidentiary privileges in
federal trials to the military's law of adultery. 15
Chapter 2 exposes the myth of the impenetrable barrier between family
and the market. The family is no place, the narrative goes, for crass talk of
economic exchange, much less reliance on it to determine the outcome of
9. Id. at 17.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 17-18.
12. See generally id. at 25-26 (criticizing the judicially created "domestic relations" exception
to federal diversity jurisdiction as "without constitutional basis or statutory codification").
13. Id. at 45.
14. See Child Support Enforcement Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-378, 98 Stat. 1305
(codified in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.) (requiring states to establish guidelines for child
support awards and standardize enforcement programs); JOANNA L. GROSSMAN & LAWRENCE M.
FRIEDMAN, INSIDE THE CASTLE: LAW AND THE FAMILY IN 20TH CENTURY AMERICA 225-31
(2011) (discussing Congress' intervention in state child support enforcement).
15. HASDAY, supra note 2, at 44-59.
20151
Texas Law Review
various conflicts.' 6 Yet, Hasday argues, when courts invoke this narrative,
they tend to "rely upon a few examples where family law loudly rejects
market principles," ignoring the more typical cases in which those
principles are routinely put to use. 17 This separation between family and
market is, for example, the basis for the rule that "agreements between
spouses for domestic labor are categorically unenforceable.' 18 Domestic
labor is supposed to be performed lovingly, without resentment, and for
free. Likewise, most courts have categorically refused to treat human
capital such as a professional degree as divisible marital property, even
when the non-degree-holding spouse has contributed substantially to its
acquisition. 19 However, Hasday argues, outside of these two contexts
"legally permissible and enforceable economic exchanges run through
family law and family relationships."2 °  Thus we see the routine
enforcement of prenuptial and postnuptial agreements, which operate to fix
the economic cost of divorce or the first spouse's death; tolerance of
economic agreements among any family members other than legal spouses
(including long-term cohabitants); and compulsory economic exchange,
such as spousal support following divorce or separation or the elective share
at death.21 The problem with insisting that family law is insulated from
economic exchange-when that clearly isn't true-is that it obscures the
nature and effects of the economic exchange that the law does or does not
tolerate. The monied husband, for example, can protect his assets against
division at divorce, but the impoverished wife cannot extract a promise of
payment for doing his laundry. The canonical narrative's insistence that
marriage is no place for enforceable economic exchange "obscures this
disparate distribution of injury. 22
In Chapters 3 and 4, Hasday considers "family law's relationship to its
past. 23  By this, she means that canonical stories "prominently feature
progress narratives recounting family law's evolution over time," which
stress "sharp breaks from history, dramatic transformations in family law
rules and policies, and the abandonment of historical practices grounded in
subordination and injustice., 24 The chapters, respectively, describe and
16. Id. at 67.
17. Id. at 68.
18. Id. at 70.
19. Id. at 70-75. New York, which allows degrees and licenses to be valued and divided, is
an outlier. Id. at 71 (citing O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 713 (N.Y. 1985)).
20. Id. at 75.
21. Id. at 75-86.
22. Id. at 86.
23. Id. at 95.
24. Id.
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critique what she terms "progress narratives for adults" and "progress
narrative[s] for children. 25 For adults, she highlights two narratives that
are oft repeated and yet less than accurate. The first "declares that family
law has disentangled itself from a legal system that enforced the legal
supremacy of husbands over wives. The other celebrates the rise of
contract rules on the presumption that they are preferable to status rules. 26
The strength of the first narrative is more compelling than the second, as
most scholars and judges understand that the move from status to contract is
at best partial and certainly situational. But Hasday spins her own
narrative, which convincingly demonstrates that gender equality in marriage
is still an aspiration, not afait accompli, and more importantly, that beliefs
to the contrary have bred both complacency and some harsh results based
on a reality that isn't.
27
As just one small, but striking, example, she tells the story of James A.
Hayes, who wrote a now-famous committee report for the California
legislature explaining the recommendation to adopt the nation's first no-
fault divorce law in 1970.28 In the report, and in a bar journal article the
following year, Hayes praised California for acknowledging that women's
newfound equality justified more lenient divorce laws and a change to the
rules regarding the economic incidents of marital dissolution.29 He then
turned to his own life and quoted his own report as justification for his
request to stop paying alimony to his ex-wife, a woman who hadn't worked
in twenty-nine years while raising the couple's four children.30 If women
have "full civil rights" and access "even" to the "professions," why should
he have to continue supporting her?3' But even with no personal interest,
courts employed similar reasoning-all but ending permanent alimony on
the theory that women could no longer be presumed or kept dependent after
32marriage. But what "liberated" women also made them poor. Given the
timing of many divorces in the life cycle, couples often have very little
25. Id. at97, 133.
26. Id. at 97.
27. See, e.g., id. at 128-30 (describing how no-fault divorce laws have made divorce "even
more economically devastating for many women").
28. Id. at 104.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 104-05.
31. Id. at 104.
32. See, e.g., Turner v. Turner, 385 A.2d 1280, 1281-82 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1978)
(observing that "women's liberation" had been transformed from "an elitist movement" to
"profound and deep social change," the court queried: "If we are to encourage a woman to seek
employment, what better way is there than to direct that alimony will be rehabilitative in nature
and will cease on some predetermined date?").
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accumulated property to divide.33 Moreover, due to the burdens of child
rearing and choices to prioritize one spouse's education or career, couples
often have vastly disparate earning capacity.34 The rejection of alimony as
an equalizer, whether rooted in false claims of equality or not, means that
the spoils and losses of marriage are often distributed unfairly. Most
studies have shown that divorce imposes harsher economic consequences
on women and children than on men.35 In this, Hasday is right to see the
harm of a canon that paints with too broad a brush and a narrative that
"treats history as safely in the past" when traditional family law principles
"still operate to undermine women's equal status., 36
Chapter 4's "progress narrative for children" tells a slightly more
complicated-and less persuasive-story. This narrative "celebrates the
supposed rejection of common law principles that prioritized parental
prerogatives and the asserted triumph of a legal regime privileging
children's interests., 37 A shorthand version of this story is that questions
involving children are resolved based on their "best interests." And while it
is true that custody disputes between two fit parents are resolved by that
formal standard,38 the standard embodies tremendous judicial discretion that
can be deeply infused with bias-in favor, for example, of women as
primary custodians whether or not that is in the best interests of a particular
child.39 Moreover, given the complexities of the modem family resulting
from the dramatic rise in unmarried childbearing, parenting by same-sex
couples, and the use of reproductive technology, an increasing number of
disputes involving children are subject to different legal standards-ones
that explicitly turn on parental prerogatives rather than children's
interests.4 0 Involuntary termination of parental rights, corporal punishment,
33. See, e.g., Marsha Garrison, The Economic Consequences of Divorce, 32 FAM. &
CONCILIATION CTS. REV. 10, 11 (1994) (reporting a study that found that the median net worth of
marital assets at divorce is less than $25,000).
34. See generally CYNTHIA LEE STARNES, THE MARRIAGE BUYOUT: THE TROUBLED
TRAJECTORY OF U.S. ALIMONY LAW 6 (2014) (arguing for a new conception of alimony as a
compensatory payment that would "go far in ensuring that primary caregivers are not thrown
under the bus when their marriages end").
35. On the economic effects of divorce, see generally GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note
14, at 202-05; James B. McLindon, Separate but Unequal: The Economic Disaster of Divorce for
Women and Children, 21 FAM. L.Q. 351, 381 & tbl.21 (1987) (summarizing data on the division
of net family assets by gender).
36. HASDAY, supra note 2, at 120.
37. Id. at 133.
38. Id. at 135.
39. Id. at 141.
40. See, e.g., Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000) (plurality opinion) (holding that
disputes between a parent and non-parent cannot be resolved by resorting to a simple best-
interests analysis).
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child labor, and education are four other areas she cites for the proposition
that we sometimes indulge parental prerogatives at the expense of
children's interests rather than in service of them.41 Thus, Hasday argues,
"declarations that family law's regulation of the parent-child relation is now
organized around children's best interests can... significantly overstate the
changes in family law over time. 42 This overstatement forestalls debate
about whether children's interests should predominate in any particular
context, as well as discussion about the merits of embracing parental
prerogatives.
The final section of Family Law Reimagined, composed of chapters 5
and 6, considers "what the canon excludes and ignores. '43 She focuses here
on the neglect of family ties other than "marriage, parenthood, and
(sometimes) their functional equivalents" and the neglect of the law's
regulation of poor families, which differs in material and sometimes
stunning ways from the regulation of higher-socioeconomic-status
families. 44 Hasday focuses on sibling relationships to emphasize the cost of
being locked into a certain conception of the family ties that bind-and that
deserve to be protected.4 5 The compulsive focus on spousal and parent-
child relationships leads to policy choices by omission. Although research
suggests that "the sibling relationship is potentially one of life's most
important connections," it is often ignored by courts, legislatures, and social
workers.46 Siblings have few if any rights against being separated after
divorce, death of a parent, or when adopted.47
Hasday begins the final chapter of Family Law Reimagined with the
strong and undeniably true statement that the poor are "noticeably absent
from the family law canon.",48 There simply are no canonical narratives
about poor families-how "family law has conquered problems of
poverty." 49 This is because family law, frankly, has made no such effort.
Nor have there been noticeable attempts to meld family law principles with
those of welfare law or child protection law. Instead, family law, and its
authors and advocates, are simply content to leave those families out.
Family law, in its most common iteration, is for the middle class and up.
41. HASDAY, supra note 2, at 145-54.
42. Id. at 141.
43. Id. at 159.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 164-65.
46. Id. at 166.
47. Id. at 168, 176.




Perhaps nowhere is this walling off of family law more evident than in the
Supreme Court's jurisprudence, which, in family law cases, emphasizes
privacy, autonomy, and freedom from unwanted governmental intrusion. °
But in welfare law, which strikes at the heart of families, the default is just
the opposite.5 l Government assistance comes at a steep cost-a weakening
of almost every aspect of family and self-determination, including things as
personal and fundamental as the decision to have children or to live with an
intimate partner. 2 On the legislative front, Hasday conducts an insightful
comparison of the family law norms embedded in Social Security, the
safety net for wage-earning families, which emphasizes "privacy and
autonomy," and those embedded in Temporary Assistance for Needy
Families, the safety net for the poor, which relies on "highly investigatory,
instrumental, and interventionist premises. 53
Through these six chapters, Family Law Reimagined clearly
establishes that there is a family law canon; that it is at times under-
inclusive, overinclusive, and downright misleading; and that the cost of a
canon that takes such liberties with the reality of family law (not to mention
the messy realities of family life) can be substantial. The power of the
canon, Hasday concludes, "lies in its ability to operate at the level of
common sense, so that canonical narratives and modes of understanding the
field appear to require no explanation or reexamination. 54 The canon not
only misleads, it also takes on normative force and obscures the questions
that really need to be asked and answered in order for families to flourish in
a variety of contexts.
III. The Power of the Canon
Even if overbroad, underinclusive, and, in some instances, clearly
inaccurate, might the existence of canonical principles of family law be
helpful? This Part takes just one aspect of the canon uncovered by Family
Law Reimagined, the localism narrative, and asks whether the
generalizations about the level of government at which family law is made
and enforced might be more complicated-and more useful-than Hasday
lets on. It also asks, more importantly, whether the canon, even if
inaccurate, might sometimes advance legitimate principles.
50. Id. at 197.
51. Id. at 198.
52. See id. at 198-208 (surveying Supreme Court decisions upholding state regulations tying
eligibility for aid to family size, willingness to allow welfare officials to make warrantless home
visits, and other family-status factors).
53. Id. at 208.
54. Id. at 221.
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Hasday is certainly right that the common tropes about family law's
localism belie the numerous and significant aspects of federal
constitutional, statutory, and administrative law that regulate the family.
But not all aspects of federal family law are created equal. Nor is it all
obviously inconsistent with the platitudes about the reservation of family
law to the states. In some key respects, federal law is circumscribed to
avoid conflicts with state family law. For example, most federal benefit
programs rely on state law determinations of family status when allocating
spousal or dependent- or surviving-child benefits. The Social Security Act
is a case in point. Although a legal parent-child relationship is the basis for
a dependent child to collect benefits when an insured parent dies, whether
that relationship exists is a function of state law.55 Thus, the Supreme Court
confirmed in a 2012 case, Astrue v. Caputo,56 that a posthumously
conceived child might inherit from a deceased biological father in one state
but not another, based solely on whether the laws of the child's home state
recognize that man as a legal parent for purposes of intestate succession.57
In other contexts, federal law supersedes family law, but in a manner
that's central to the federal-state balance of power and not unique to this
area of law. Constitutional guarantees of equal protection and due process,
for example, by design, supersede state law enactments. This has become
more relevant in family law, as the Supreme Court has recognized more and
broader protections for intimate and family relationships-a constitutional
right to marry that brings heightened scrutiny upon state laws that directly
and substantially interfere with marriage; 58 constitutionally protected
parental rights, relevant in conflicts with third parties, the state, and would-
be coparents; 59 constitutional protection for living with even distant
55. See 42 U.S.C. §§ 402(d), 416(e), (h)(2)(A) (2012) (using state intestacy laws to determine
whether a Social Security applicant is the child or parent of an insured individual); 20 C.F.R.
§§ 404.354-355 (2014) (same).
56. 132 S. Ct. 2021 (2012).
57. Id. at 2026, 2032.
58. See Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (recognizing the freedom to marry as a vital
right); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386-87 (1978) (invalidating a marriage restriction that
"directly and substantially" interfered with the right to marry); Turner v. Safley, 482 U.S. 78, 96
(1987) (finding constitutional protection for the right to marry even in the prison context).
59. The trilogy establishing constitutional protection for parental rights vis-i-vis the state
includes Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 397, 401-03 (1923) (invalidating a Nebraska law
banning instruction in a foreign language before ninth grade); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268
U.S. 510, 530, 534-35 (1925) (invalidating an Oregon law requiring children between the ages of
eight and sixteen to attend public school); and Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 169-71
(1944) (upholding the conviction of a child's aunt for allowing the child to sell religious
pamphlets in violation of state labor law). That parental rights are also protected vis-A-vis
challenges by third parties was reinforced in Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57 (2000), in which a
plurality ruled that a third-party visitation statute was unconstitutional as applied to a particular
2015]
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relatives; 60 and constitutional protection for intimate relationships. 61 The
federal-state balance that ensues is no different than the balance in criminal
procedure, voting rights, or any number of other areas that touch on
individual constitutional rights. In still other contexts, the federal
government regulates family only incidentally to administer a decidedly
federal area of law-immigration, tax, or copyright, to take the most
obvious examples.
The simple fact that there are federal law enactments that affect the
family does not tell us much. Despite these various forms of federal family
law, it is still by and large true that family law and family status are
controlled by the states. The recent controversy over the federal Defense of
Marriage Act (DOMA) 62 reveals how that generalization, blunt edged as it
might be, can be important. DOMA, which passed through both houses of
Congress by a wide margin with little by way of debate,6a took steps to stop
the potential spread of marriages by same-sex couples in the event any state
legalized them. Section 2 amended the Full Faith and Credit Act to provide
that states did not have to give effect to same-sex marriages from other
states (a misguided and redundant provision to overcome a compulsion that
didn't exist in the first place), 64 and Section 3 defined marriage as a union
mother because it did not give special weight to her decision to deny more expansive visitation
with her children's grandparents. Id. at 72.
60. See Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 495-96, 506 (1977) (invalidating, on
constitutional grounds, an Ohio housing ordinance limiting occupancy of a dwelling to single
nuclear families).
61. See Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 562, 567 (2003) (invalidating law criminalizing
same-sex sodomy on constitutional grounds).
62. Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996) (codified at
1 U.S.C. § 7 (2012) and 28 U.S.C. § 1738C (2012)).
63. See 142 CONG. REC. 17,094 (1996) (noting a 342-67 House vote); 142 CONG. REC.
22,467 (1996) (noting a 85-14 Senate vote); Peter Baker, President Quietly Signs Law Aimed at
Gay Marriages, WASH. POST, Sept. 22, 1996, at A21 (noting that President Clinton "waited until
the dead of night" to sign DOMA, "timing his action to minimize public attention and contain any
political damage"). For a more detailed history of DOMA's enactment, see generally Joanna L.
Grossman, Defense of Marriage Act, Will You Please Go Now!, 2012 CARDOZO L. REV. DE.NOVO
155, 156-59.
64. The Act states:
No State, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe, shall be
required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial proceeding of any other
State, territory, possession, or tribe respecting a relationship between persons of the
same sex that is treated as a marriage under the laws of such other State, territory,
possession, or tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
Defense of Marriage Act § 2(a), 28 U.S.C. § 1738C. On the inapplicability of full faith and credit
principles to marriage recognition and the resulting redundancy of § 2, see generally Joanna L.
Grossman, Fear and Loathing in Massachusetts: Same-Sex Marriage and Some Lessons from the
History of Marriage and Divorce, 14 B.U. PuB. INT. L.J. 87, 105-06 (2004) [hereinafter
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between a man and a woman for all federal law purposes.65 In a 2013
decision, a 5-4 majority of the Supreme Court ruled that Section 3 of
DOMA was a violation of the equal protection principles embodied in the
Fifth Amendment.66 Congress enacted DOMA in 1996, as the controversy
over marriages by same-sex couples was reaching fever pitch.67 The
catalyst was Hawaii, which was poised to legalize same-sex marriage
because of a ruling from the state's highest court in 1993 that the ban
merited strict scrutiny and was likely to be struck down after a trial on
remand.68  DOMA was followed by the enactment of statutes and
constitutional amendments across the country designed to preclude the
celebration of same-sex marriages and bar recognition of those validly
celebrated elsewhere. 69 But at some point, the tilt of the country shifted,
and states began to embrace marriage equality in droves.7° While there are
still many states that have remained steadfast in their opposition, the
Windsor7 1 decision marked the winding down of the wars marked by its
enactment.
What does Windsor tell us about the relevance of the family law
canon? To strike down Section 3 of DOMA, the Court could have taken a
variety of different tacks. The broadest one would have rejected the federal
government's attempt to deny recognition to marriages by same-sex couples
because all laws restricting marriage to heterosexual couples are a violation
of due process, equal protection, or both. In a companion case,
Holllingsworth v. Perry,72 the Court was asked to rule just so in a case
Grossman, Fear and Loathing]; Joanna L. Grossman, Resurrecting Comity: Revisiting the
Problem of Non-Uniform Marriages Laws, 84 OR. L. REV. 433, 452 (2005) [hereinafter
Resurrecting Comity].
65. The Act states:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling, regulation, or
interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and agencies of the United States,
the word "marriage" means only a legal union between one man and one woman as
husband and wife, and the word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex
who is a husband or a wife.
Defense of Marriage Act § 3(a), 1 U.S.C. § 7.
66. United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2683, 2696 (2013).
67. See Grossman, Fear and Loathing, supra note 64, at 105-07 (discussing the legislative
history of DOMA).
68. Id. at 105-06 (citing Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44, 67 (Haw. 1993)).
69. On these developments, see GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 146-49.
70. The current count is thirty-five states and the District of Columbia, but this continues to be
an era of rapid change. For up-to-date information, see Marriage Equality and Other Relationship
Recognition Laws, HUM. RTS. CAMPAIGN, http://www.hrc.org/campaigns/marriage-center,
archived at http://perma.cc/5WAW-XWBR.
71. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675.
72. 133 S. Ct. 2652 (2013).
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challenging the constitutionality of California's Proposition 8, a voter
referendum making marriages by same-sex couples unconstitutional.73 In
that case, however, the Court did not reach the merits question-whether a
state can ban same-sex marriage without running afoul of the U.S.
Constitution-but instead dismissed the case on standing grounds.74
Although this led indirectly to the legalization of same-sex marriage in
California, because of a ruling that denied Prop 8's defenders standing to
appeal an adverse judgment in the trial court, it left in place other similar
bans, including DOMA.
The Windsor majority could also have ruled that Section 3 of DOMA
was invalid because the federal government does not have the power.to
define marriage because marriage has traditionally been defined by the
states. This tack would have been all but the grossest example of the
misuse Hasday warns about-giving normative power not only to a
description, but a misdescription. But there were briefs urging this
approach, relying on the exact narratives Hasday relies on in Family Law
Reimagined,75 and the justices at oral argument seemed inclined to strike
down DOMA because it represented an inappropriate federal incursion into
family law.76 Yet, there are many other instances in which the federal
government utilizes its own definition of marriage-to judge entitlement to
spousal citizenship, to give just one example-and thus it cannot be the
case that the federal government is simply forbidden to define marriage.77
In the end, though, the Windsor opinion took a more nuanced approach
that did rely on the localism narrative but stopped short of turning a
description into a prescription or limitation. In fact, it made good use of the
localism narrative to understand the Congressional purpose behind DOMA.
When first enacted, Section 3 of DOMA had no import because there
were no states that allowed the celebration of marriages by same-sex
couples-and thus no marriages for the federal government to refuse to
73. Id. at 2659.
74. Id.
75. See, e.g., Brief on the Merits for Amicus Curiae The Partnership for New York City in
Support of Respondent Windsor and Affirmance of the Second Circuit at 10-16, United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (2013) (No. 12-307).
76. See Transcript of Oral Argument at 56, 59, 67-68, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307)
(recording questions focusing on the traditional role of the state by Justices Ginsburg, Kennedy,
and Sotomayor). But see Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (deeming it "unnecessary to decide whether
this federal intrusion on state power is a violation of the Constitution because it disrupts the
federal balance").
77. See, e.g., 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1)(A)(i) (2012) (providing that marriages "entered into for
the purpose of procuring an alien's admission [to the United States] as an immigrant" will not
entitle the immigrant to that status even if the marriage is otherwise valid under state law).
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recognize. But when first Massachusetts,78 and then a cascade of other
states, embraced marriage equality, this provision of DOMA wreaked havoc
by refusing to acknowledge that same-sex marriages existed. As a practical
matter, this meant that couples who were legally married in their home state
or another state were nevertheless treated as single by the federal
government for purposes ranging from immigration to taxes to Social
Security. Marital status, it turns out, is relevant to over 1,000 federal
laws.79
Windsor involved a typical federal-state law conflict under DOMA. A
woman's female widow-the couple had legally married in Canada and had
their marriage given effect in New York-was charged over $300,000 in
estate taxes. 80 Transfers to a legal surviving spouse are tax free under the
federal estate tax, 81 but because the federal law provision of DOMA
prevented the Internal Revenue Service (IRS) from recognizing the couple's
marriage, this widow was taxed.82 The widow, Edith Windsor, filed suit
challenging the constitutionality of DOMA and requesting a tax refund as a
"surviving spouse. ' 83
A federal district court sided with Windsor, holding that this provision
of DOMA was indeed unconstitutional.84 Congress, the court reasoned, had
no legitimate reason to refuse recognition to some marriages based solely
on the sexual orientation of the parties. 85 Refusing to stay the judgment
pending appeal, the court ordered the IRS to immediately refund over
78. See Goodridge v. Dep't of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 969-70 (Mass. 2003)
(invalidating state ban on marriages by same-sex couples and authorizing the issuance of licenses
in May 2004). Until 2008, Massachusetts was the only state to allow the celebration of same-sex
marriages. GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 152-53.
79. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683; see also U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE, GAO-04-
353R, DEFENSE OF MARRIAGE ACT: UPDATE TO PRIOR REPORT 1 (2004) (noting that there are
1,138 federal laws to which marital status is relevant).
80. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2683.
81. See 26 U.S.C. § 2056(a) (2012) (excluding from taxation "any interest in property which
passes or has passed from the decedent to his surviving spouse").
82. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2682.
83. Id. at 2682. At the time, New York did not allow for the celebration of valid same-sex
marriages, but it did give effect to those that were validly celebrated elsewhere. See, e.g., Godfrey
v. Spano, 920 N.E.2d 328, 336-37 (N.Y. 2009) (upholding validity of Executive Order
recognizing out-of-state marriages by same-sex couples). Subsequently, the New York legislature
passed a law to legalize same-sex marriage. Marriage Equality Act, ch. 95, 2011 N.Y. Laws 749
(codified at N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW §§ 10-a, 10-b, 13 (McKinney 2014)); Nicholas Confessore &
Michael Barbaro, New York Allows Same-Sex Marriage, Becoming Largest State to Pass Law,
N.Y. TIMES, June 24, 2011, http://www.nytimes.com/2011/06/25/nyregion/gay-marriage-approve
d-by-new-york-senate.html?pagewanted=all&_r = I&, archived at http://perma.cc/7VEH-YPSL.
84. Windsor v. United States, 833 F. Supp. 2d 394, 406 (S.D.N.Y. 2012)
85. Id. at 402-06.
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86$350,000 to the decedent's estate. Although the ruling was appealed, both
parties asked the Supreme Court to hear the case while that appeal was still
pending. 87 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals did rule-affirming the
trial court's conclusion that sexual orientation classifications are entitled to
heightened scrutiny and that the federal government had an insufficiently
compelling reason for refusing to give effect to marriages by same-sex
couples.
88
The Supreme Court considered whether "Section 3 of DOMA violates
the Fifth Amendment's guarantee of equal protection of the laws as applied
to persons of the same sex who are legally married under the laws of their
State.",89 The majority said yes. 90
Like his majority opinion in Lawrence v. Texas,9' in which the Court
ruled 6-3 that state criminal bans on same-sex sexual behavior violate the
right to privacy protected in the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, 92 Justice Kennedy's opinion in Windsor showed sensitivity to
emerging social norms about gay rights and relationships and performed a
nuanced analysis of relevant constitutional principles
Justice Kennedy's constitutional analysis in Windsor began by noting
the novelty of the arrangement the Court was being asked to consider:
"[U]ntil recent years, many citizens had not even considered the possibility
that two persons of the same sex might aspire to occupy the same status and
dignity as that of a man and woman in lawful marriage." 93 The novelty
pushed both defenders and challengers into stauncher positions. For
opponents of marriage by same-sex couples, the belief that a man and
woman are "essential to the very definition" of marriage "became even
more urgent, more cherished when challenged. 94 But others reacted to the
suggestion of same-sex marriage with "the beginnings of a new perspective,
a new insight., 95  Quickly, the "limitation of lawful marriage to
heterosexual couples, which for centuries had been deemed both necessary
86. Id. at 406.
87. Petition for a Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at 1, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-
307) [hereinafter Solicitor's Petition] (petitioning the Court on behalf of the United States);
Petition for Writ of Certiorari Before Judgment at 1, Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675 (No. 12-307)
(petitioning the Court on behalf of Edith Windsor).
88. Windsor v. United States, 699 F.3d 169, 185, 188 (2d Cir. 2012).
89. Solicitor's Petition, supra note 87, at 1.
90. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2695.
91. 538 U.S. 558 (2003).
92. Id. at 578-79.
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and fundamental, came to be seen in New York and certain other States as
an unjust exclusion." 96
But the Supreme Court's role was not to mediate a political dispute. It
was to determine whether Congress could constitutionally pick a side by
refusing to acknowledge the marriages between same-sex couples validly
authorized by certain states. Justice Kennedy began the constitutional
analysis with a discussion of the traditional regulation of marriage-cue the
localism narrative. "By history and tradition," marriage has been "treated
as being within the authority and realm of the separate States." 97 Subject to
constitutional limitations, "'regulation of domestic relations' is 'an area that
has long been regarded as a virtually exclusive province of the States."' 98
Regulation of marriage is "the foundation of the State's broader authority to
regulate the subject of domestic relations with respect to the '[p]rotection of
offspring, property interests, and the enforcement of marital responsibili-
ties."' 99 Consistent with this tradition, "the Federal Government, through
our history, has deferred to state law policy decisions with respect to
domestic relations."' 00 This "allocation of authority," the Court observed,
"dates to the Nation's beginning."10' It is thus a "long-established precept
that the incidents, benefits, and obligations of marriage are uniform for all
married couples within each State, though they may vary, subject to
constitutional guarantees, from one State to the next."'
0 2
Yet, the Court noted in Windsor, Congress does have the authority to
"make determinations that bear on marital rights and privileges" when
acting "in the exercise of its own proper authority."'' 0 3 Congress thus can,
for example, refuse to grant citizenship rights to the noncitizen spouse in a
sham marriage (one entered into solely for purposes of procuring
immigration rights) even if the marriage would be valid for state law
purposes. 10 4 Congress can also make its own determinations about what
counts as marriage, if it chooses to, to avoid overpayment of Social Security
benefits 10 5 or impose special protections on spouses under pension plans
96. Id.
97. Id. at 2689-90.
98. Id. at 2691 (quoting Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)).
99. Id. (quoting Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287, 298 (1942)).
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 2692.
103. Id. at 2690.
104. Id. (citing 8 U.S.C. § 1186a(b)(1) (2012)).
105. Id. (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1382c(d)(2) (2012)).
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regulated by ERISA in furtherance of the statute's intent to protect
retirement security. 1
06
What makes DOMA different from these examples-and
unconstitutional? In the three examples cited in Windsor, and noted above,
Congress is regulating marriage "in order to further federal policy."' 0 7
Justice Kennedy writes of DOMA's "far greater reach" a "directive
applicable to over 1,000 federal statutes and the whole realm of federal
regulations."' 108 Moreover, DOMA is targeted at a single class of persons, a
class that some states have sought specifically to protect. But its reach
alone does not dictate its validity. Rather, the majority opinion relies
directly on the localism narrative-and DOMA's stark departure from it-
to find an independent basis for deeming the law unconstitutional. Yes, the
Court agreed, marriage has traditionally been the province of the states.
Yes, states must conform to constitutional standards, but they have
otherwise been left to determine the rules regarding entry into, conduct of,
and exit from marriage. Whether or not the federal government has the
power to define'09 marriage (or other aspects of family status) on a broad
basis, it has largely chosen not to. The vast majority of federal laws that
turn on marital status rely on state definitions rather than supplying their
own.
Justice Kennedy does not suggest that the federal government cannot
regulate marriage because it has traditionally not done so. Rather, he
examines the tradition of deference to state definitions of marriage and
concludes that DOMA is, at a minimum, unusual. And, according to the
Court's ruling in Romer v. Evans:"!0 "Discriminations of an unusual
character especially suggest careful consideration to determine whether they
are obnoxious to the constitutional provision.""' This is so because they
raise an inference of "improper animus or purpose,"' 12 which is insufficient
to sustain a law against an equal protection attack even under the lowest
standard of review."13 The "Constitution's guarantee of equality," Justice
106. See 29 U.S.C. § 1055(c) (2012) (requiring that a spouse approve applicable pension-
plan-beneficiary changes or loans secured by the pension); Egelhoff v. Egelhoff, 532 U.S. 141,
143, 150 (2001) (holding that ERISA preempts a Washington statute that placed an undue burden
on divorced spouses).
107. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2690.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 2693.
110. 517 U.S. 620 (1996).
111. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. at 2692 (quoting Romer, 517 U.S. at 633) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
112. Id. at 2693.
113. Id. at 2695-96.
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Kennedy wrote, "'must at the very least mean that a bare congressional
desire to harm a politically unpopular group cannot' justify disparate
treatment of that group."'1 4 DOMA could not survive this analysis. As
Justice Kennedy concluded:
DOMA's unusual deviation from the usual tradition of recognizing
and accepting state definitions of marriage here operates to deprive
same-sex couples of the benefits and responsibilities that come with
the federal recognition of their marriages. This is strong evidence of
a law having the purpose and effect of disapproval of that class. The
avowed purpose and practical effect of the law here in question are
to impose a disadvantage, a separate status, and so a stigma upon all
who enter into same-sex marriages made lawful by the unquestioned
authority of the States.1
1 5
When combined with the direct evidence of Congress's moral
disapproval of marriages by same-sex couples,' 16 the inference drawn from
DOMA's unusual character was enough to sink it." 7
Justice Kennedy makes clear that his disdain for DOMA is strong.
The opinion concludes with a long and pointed critique of DOMA and its
impact on same-sex married couples. The law diminishes "the stability and
predictability of basic personal relations the State has found it proper to
acknowledge and protect."' 1 8 It "undermines both the public and private
significance of state-sanctioned marriages" by telling couples, "and all the
world," that "their otherwise valid marriages are unworthy of federal
recognition."'" 9  It imposes upon them a "second-tier marriage."'"2  It
"humiliates tens of thousands of children now being raised by same-sex
couples" and "makes it even more difficult for the children to understand
the integrity and closeness of their own family and its concord with other
families in their community and in their daily lives.' 12 1 Same-sex couples
"have their lives burdened... in visible and public ways."' 122 The law
touches "many aspects of married and family life, from the mundane to the
114. Id. at 2693 (quoting U.S. Dep't ofAgric. v. Moreno, 413 U.S. 528, 534 (1973)).
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. See id. at 2696 (concluding that DOMA "is invalid, for no legitimate purpose overcomes
the purpose and effect to disparage and to injure those whom the State, by its marriage laws,
sought to protect in personhood and dignity").







profound."'123 And it does all this under the guise of a law whose "principal
purpose and necessary effect" are to "demean those persons who are in a
lawful same-sex marriage.
'24
It may be that the Court would have invalidated DOMA even if it
hadn't starkly departed from the family-law localism tradition, but that
narrative-with all its flaws-was the basis for the ruling in Windsor.
Moreover, the departure-from-tradition argument has fueled litigation
challenging the validity of state bans on recognition of marriages by same-
sex couples. 125 The crux of the argument is that just as Congress departed
from tradition in singling out a type of marriage for denial of recognition,
states have departed from a long history of recognizing out-of-state
marriages in order to deny recognition of marriages by same-sex couples.
The tradition, embodied in the place of celebration rule followed by most
states, is to exercise comity and give effect, in most instances, to marriages
validly celebrated out of state.1 26 Perhaps this is not a significant enough
tradition to have canonical stature, but it is one of the mostly accurate
truisms of family law that marriage is portable across state lines. Refusing
to exercise comity for one particular type of marriage, when the tradition
has been to give effect to marriages as long as they were valid where
celebrated, is, the argument goes, also a "discrimination of an unusual
character" that raises constitutional suspicion. Several federal district
courts have embraced this argument in post-Windsor cases,"27 as has one
federal appellate court (the first to reach the recognition issue). In Baskin v.
Bogan,128 Judge Posner invalidated the bans on celebration of same-sex
marriages in three states, but also their separate bans on recognition of out-
123. Id.
124. Id. at 2695.
125. See, e.g., Obergefell v. Wymyslo, 962 F. Supp. 2d 968, 993, 995 (S.D. Ohio 2013)
(finding constitutional violation on Ohio's refusal to recognize out-of-state marriages by same-sex
couples despite long history of recognizing other prohibited marriages), rev 'd, DeBoer v. Snyder,
772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014).
126. On the history of interstate marriage recognition, see generally Grossman, Resurrecting
Comity, supra note 64.
127. See, e.g., Whitewood v. Wolf, 992 F. Supp. 2d 410, 431 (M.D. Pa. 2014); Henry v.
Himes, 14 F. Supp. 3d 1036, 1061-62 (S.D. Ohio 2014), rev'd, DeBoer, 772 F.3d 388; Tanco v.
Haslam, 7 F. Supp. 3d 759, 772 (M.D. Tenn. 2014), rev'd, DeBoer, 772 F.3d 388; DeLeon v.
Perry, 975 F. Supp. 2d 632, 662 (W.D. Tex. 2014); Bourke v. Beshear, 996 F. Supp. 2d 542, 543,
550-52 (W.D. Ky. 2014) (invalidating statutory and constitutional bans on recognition of
marriages by same-sex couples from other states and noting that the reasoning in Windsor
"establishes certain principles that strongly suggest the result here"); Obergefell, 962 F. Supp. 2d
at 995 (invalidating Ohio's refusal "for the first time in its history" to recognize a particular type
of out-of-state marriage, one between parties of the same sex), rev'd, DeBoer, 772 F.3d 388.
128. 766 F.3d 648 (7th Cir. 2014).
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of-state marriages. 129 With respect to Indiana, he noted "the kicker" that the
state "will as a matter of comity recognize any marriage lawful where
contracted" but will not grant the same comity to marriages by same-sex
couples; this "suggests animus."'
130
In Windsor, Justice Kennedy both avoids the trap Hasday wams
about-turning a descriptive observation into a normative principle-and
uses the localism narrative to smoke out Congress's true purpose. And in
the post-Windsor cases-some of which the Supreme Court has agreed to
review during the October 2014 terml 3'--we see an extension of the same
analytical approach, but with a smaller, less established narrative. We
might draw two conclusions from these examples: (1) that the canon is
more nuanced than Hasday describes or (2) that the canon, by definition a
set of generalizations, can advance legal analysis whether or not it is exactly
right in all the particulars. Either way, Windsor represents the power, rather
than the peril of a loose canon.
IV. The Perils of the Canon
As I argued in Part III, a set of generalizations or narratives about an
area of law can be analytically useful, even essential. One might shudder to
think what family law cases and statutes would look like if each were truly
tabula rasa-handed down by some sort of alien invader who was in the
dark about the history, traditions, and structure of this area of law. But
Hasday is right that overreliance on common narratives can obscure as
much or more as it enlightens. Family law's very success and growth as a
field has, in this sense, endangered its content. This is, one might say, the
peril of the canon.
Although Family Law Reimagined offers innumerable examples where
proper policy or legal analysis is subverted by misuse of common narratives
or platitudes, parentage law offers yet another. As discussed above,
Chapters 3 and 4 tell family law's progress narratives-featuring the ways
in which family law is alleged to have broken ties with its past and been
reshaped around modem norms and ideals, including a strong preference for
serving children's interests. One need only look cursorily (which is all the
length of this Review permits) at the tenets of parentage law to see the
strong, and yet often illogical, ties to the past, as well as a consistent
prioritizing of adults' over children's interests.
129. Id. at 657, 672.
130. Id. at 666.
131. DeBoer v. Snyder, 772 F.3d 388 (6th Cir. 2014), cert. granted, 83 U.S.L.W. 3607, 3608
(U.S. Jan. 16, 2015) (No. 14-574).
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Parentage law traditionally revolved around relatively simple questions
of marital status and legitimacy. 132 Children born to married women had
two parents-the woman who gave birth and her husband, who was
conclusively presumed to be the child's father unless he was absent or
impotent. 133 Although children born out of wedlock were considered filius
nullius-the child of nobody-under English law, 134 by the end of the
nineteenth century, most states considered a child born to an unmarried
woman to have a legal mother but no legal father. 135 Legitimate children
thus had two parents; illegitimate children had one. This system made a
certain amount of sense in a world in which all children were conceived
through sex, sex outside of marriage was socially taboo and legally
forbidden, and science was not advanced enough to definitively tie any
particular man to a child. The traditional rules thus operated within these
parameters. The husband was presumed to be the father of a married
woman's child both as a proxy for biology-he was the most likely
candidate given social norms and practices136-and because allowing proof
of a competing claim would invade the couple's privacy and likely unravel
the marriage, all in pursuit of a "truth" that would be little more than
conjecture based on rumor, innuendo, and suspicion. Better for a child to
have the wrong father in a norm-compliant family than the converse-or no
father at all. The child of an unmarried woman, on the other hand, might be
deprived of a legal father under the conventional rules, but this was largely
confirming the most likely social outcome given the societal sanctions for
nonmarital sexual relationships, the unlikelihood of financial support from
an unwed father, and the marginality of the relationships that might lead to
an illegitimate child in those days.
132. For more on the entwining of parentage and legitimacy, see generally Joanna L.
Grossman, The New Illegitimacy: Tying Parentage to Marital Status for Lesbian Co-Parents, 20
AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 671 (2012).
133. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 117 (1989) (upholding California's law
providing that the "issue of a wife cohabiting with her husband, who is not impotent, is
indisputably presumed to be legitimate" (quoting CAL. EvD. CODE § 621(a) (West Supp. 1989)
(repealed 1992) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
134. MARY ANN MASON, FROM FATHER'S PROPERTY TO CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: THE HISTORY
OF CHILD CUSTODY IN THE UNITED STATES 24 (1994).
135. On this history, see generally HARRY D. KRAUSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL
POLICY 28-36 (1971); John Witte, Jr., Ishmael's Bane: The Sin and Crime of Illegitimacy
Reconsidered, 5 PUNISHMENT & SOC'Y 327 (2003).
136. See Chris W. Altenbernd, Quasi-Marital Children: The Common Law's Failure in
Privette and Daniel Calls for Statutory Reform, 26 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 219, 227-28 (1999) (citing
a 1940s study finding 10% of children born to married women were conceived in adultery). On
the powerful legal and social norms confining legitimate sex to marriage, see generally
GROSSMAN & FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at ch. 2.
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It's not a stretch to say that everything has changed. Babies are
conceived in test tubes with gametes from strangers; women have babies for
people who can't; same-sex couples intentionally become parents together
(using some of those test tubes and gametes); over forty percent of children
are born to unmarried parents; 137 and DNA testing can tell us with almost
100% accuracy the identity of a child's genetic father. The legal changes
have been almost as dramatic. Unwed fathers cannot, as a constitutional
matter, be categorically disregarded. 138 The biological tie gives a man the
unique opportunity to "develop a relationship" with his child; he has
constitutionally protected parental rights if he "grasps that opportunity" and
accepts some "responsibility for the child's future. ' ,13 9  Meanwhile,
illegitimate children have their own constitutional rights against
discrimination, 40 and the constitutionally protected rights of an established
legal parent (say, a mother who acquires legal parent status by the act of
giving birth) cannot be diluted by the recognition of a second legal parent
without her consent. 141
Yet, despite these oceanic social and legal changes-which led Justice
O'Connor to declare in a 2000 opinion that the "demographic changes of
the past century make it difficult to speak of an average American
family" 42-there is no effort in parentage law to break sharply from its
past, even as families themselves have made such a break. Nor any to
ensure that children's interests are protected in the increasingly complicated
scenarios-involving, in some cases, as many as five different adults-that
lead to their conception. 43 Rather, parentage law has developed primarily
through analogy, seriously hampered by the fact that it is hard to construct a
137. See Brady E. Hamilton et al., Births: Preliminary Data for 2011, NAT'L VITAL STAT.
REP., Oct. 3, 2012, at 1, 7 tbl.1 (reporting that 40.7% of births in 2011 and 40.8% of births in 2010
were to unmarried women).
138. See Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645, 649 (1972) (invalidating Illinois's law that
conclusively denied legal parent status to unwed father regardless of his ties to the children).
139. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 242, 262 (1983).
140. See, e.g., Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68, 69, 71-72 (1968) (striking down law that
precluded a deceased mother's five children from collecting damages for her wrongful death
because they had been born out of wedlock).
141. See, e.g., Boseman v. Jarrell, 704 S.E.2d 494, 504-05 (N.C. 2010) (enforcing agreement
to share parental rights with lesbian coparent because she acted inconsistently with her paramount
legal status by "intentionally and voluntarily creat[ing] a family unit in which [the coparent] was
intended to act-and acted-as a parent" to a child they "jointly decided to bring. . . into their
relationship"); Janice M. v. Margaret K., 948 A.2d 73, 87 (Md. 2008) (refusing to recognize de
facto parent status for fear of overriding a legal parent's parental rights without a showing of
unfitness or exceptional circumstances).
142. Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 63 (2000).
143. Consider a case in which a child is conceived with donor egg and donor sperm, carried
by a gestational surrogate, and raised by two intended parents with no genetic tie to the child.
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bridge between such different worlds. Even the Uniform Parentage Act,
adopted in 1973 and substantially revised in 2000 and 2002, continues the
traditional framework for determining parentage, simply expanding
categories where necessary. 144  A married man who consents to the
insemination of his wife with donor sperm is the child's legal father
because his consent substitutes for his biological contribution. 1
45
Consider the law of lesbian coparents' rights as just one example of
the consequences of stumbling forward without, as Hasday urges, doing
some reimagining and recasting. Most of the states that have embraced
marriage equality have indicated through statute or case law that the
traditional marital presumption of paternity applies with equal force to
married lesbian couples. 146 In other words, a woman is presumed to be the
"father" of her wife's child if they married before the birth of the child. But
why? If marriage is a proxy for biology, it makes no sense to apply the
presumption to a partner of the same sex, whom we know did not contribute
sperm to conceive the child. If the presumption is a means to protect a
marriage that might be destroyed by proof of adultery, it would also make
no sense to apply the presumption to a lesbian spouse because it is already
apparent that she is not genetically tied to the child-and that fact does not
give rise to an inference that the woman who gives birth has cheated. It is
obvious to all but the completely uninformed that the conception involved a
third party.
Yet, there might be very good reasons to assign parentage to a lesbian
coparent. Perhaps the biological mother's decision to marry before or
during a pregnancy signifies her intent to share parental rights. Perhaps the
partner's decision to marry reflects her intent to function as a coparent of
any child born to either of them. Or perhaps a child born into a married
couple's home should be presumed to benefit from continuing the
relationship with both spouses. But courts often ignore these questions,
focusing instead on bright-line rules and concepts that are familiar and
accepted in family law. Depending on the jurisdiction, a lesbian coparent's
rights can turn on whether she was married to the biological mother before
144. UNIF. PARENTAGE ACT, 9B U.L.A. 295 (2001).
145. Id. § 703.
146. See, e.g., WASH. REV. CODE. ANN. § 26.04.010(3) (West Supp. 2013) ("Where
necessary to implement the rights and responsibilities of spouses under the law, gender specific
terms such as husband and wife used in any statute, rule, or other law must be construed to be
gender neutral and applicable to spouses of the same sex."); Miller-Jenkins v. Miller-Jenkins, 912
A.2d 951, 971 (Vt. 2006) (noting that civil union partner was entitled to presumption of parentage
with respect to her partner's biological child born during the civil union).
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the birth of a child; 147 whether she qualifies as a de facto parent, who has
earned rights through actual parenting;148 whether she has entered into an
enforceable coparenting agreement with the biological mother; 49 or
whether she has legally adopted the child.150  The relative importance of
biology, intent, contract, and parental function varies tremendously by
jurisdiction and even by individual case, adding confusion and
unpredictability to a determination of critical importance. Moreover,
nowhere in the determination of a lesbian coparent's rights, under any of
these approaches, is there express consideration of a child's best interests.
The battle is over parental rights, plain and simple. A better approach, as I
have argued elsewhere, would be to start with a clean slate and articulate
the basis on which parental status should be assigned, one that could be
adapted across the increasingly complicated spectrum of scenarios in which
children are brought into this world. This approach would honor Hasday's
call for more focus on the actual questions facing courts and policy makers
today-and potentially deliver more sensible results than the current
approaches.
V. Conclusion
Hasday proposes in her introduction not to eliminate the family law
canon, but to recast it "to more accurately describe family law and its
guiding principles" so that judges, lawyers, legislators, and families
themselves can "assess family law as it is" and "debate the actual choices
facing the field." 151 In this regard, she has certainly succeeded. Canonical
crutches, like stereotypes or "conventional wisdom," often overgeneralize
and oversimplify, sometimes with harmful results. Hasday's book is full of
such cautionary, and expertly told, tales. The question she leaves for others
is what family will look like if we shed the loose canon of family law and
take the fresh look she invites.
147. See, e.g., Debra H. v. Janice R., 930 N.E.2d 184, 195-96 (N.Y. 2010) (refusing to
recognize de facto parentage status but granting parental rights to lesbian coparent because she
entered a civil union with the biological mother prior to the child's birth); Grossman, supra note
132, at 692 (explaining the trend "towards recognition that marital status creates . . . a
presumption ofjoint parentage for same-sex couples").
148. See, e.g., In re H.S.H.-K, 533 N.W.2d 419, 421 (Wis. 1995) (establishing a four-part test
for recognition of de facto parentage status).
149. See, e.g., Frazier v. Goudschaal, 295 P.3d 542, 558 (Kan. 2013) (finding a coparenting
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